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Abstract 
 
More than half of the World Trade Organization (WTO)-notified services trade agreements 
(STAs) in effect since 2008 have involved at least one (South or Southeast) Asian trading 
partner. Drawing on Baier and Bergstrand’s (2004) determinants of preferential trade 
agreements and using the World Bank’s database on the restrictiveness of domestic services 
regimes (Borchert et.al. 2012), we examine the potential for negotiated regulatory convergence 
in Asian services markets. Our results suggest that countries within Asia that are more remote 
from the rest of the world and that have similar economic sizes, greater differences in relative 
factor endowments compared to the rest of the world, common legal origins, high levels of pre-
existing trade, and restrictive services regulations are more likely candidates for regulatory 
convergence. Our empirical model successfully predicts 10 of the 14 STAs negotiated during 
2008–12 and 88 of the 89 dyads within Asia that lack an STA. 
 
 
Keywords: PTAs, services, regulation, regulatory convergence, Asia 
 
JEL Classification:  F10, F13, F15 
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1. Introduction 
 
One of the striking features of trade diplomacy in recent years has been the seemingly 
unstoppable march of preferential trade liberalization and rule-making (Kawai and Wignajara 
2010). Such a trend is now extending to services, most spectacularly of late in the Asia-Pacific 
region (Chanda 2011, PECC and ADBI 2011, Shepherd and Pasadilla 2012). Of the 80 
preferential trade agreements (PTAs) in force prior to 2000, 70 (87.5%) featured provisions 
dealing exclusively with trade in goods. Since then, 98 of the 166 PTAs that have entered into 
force also include provisions on services trade. Meanwhile, more than half of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO)-notified services trade agreements (STAs) in effect since 2008 have 
involved at least one South or Southeast Asian trading partner. The above trends signal the 
heightened importance of services trade in general, the growing need among countries to place 
such trade on a firmer institutional and rule-making footing, and the attractiveness of doing so 
on an expedited basis via preferential negotiating platforms (Sauvé and Shingal 2011).  
 
Unlike trade in goods, where the removal of border barriers retains significant negotiating 
traction, domestic regulation is the sole currency of negotiations in services trade (Mattoo and 
Sauvé 2010). The importance and potentially trade- and investment-inhibiting impact of 
domestic regulation on service sector performance has received significant attention in policy 
research circles (Kox and Nordas 2007 and 2009). However, less well understood and 
investigated has been the question of whether certain countries are more likely candidates for 
negotiated regulatory convergence from a services trade perspective? Simply put: are countries 
that display greater ex-ante regulatory convergence more likely candidates for deeper 
integration agreements in services markets? What is the role of geography in trade-facilitating 
regulatory convergence in services? And can the presence of significant developmental or 
institutional capacity gaps impede integration and convergence in services markets?  
 
This paper seeks answers to the above questions in an Asian setting.1 According to the WTO’s 
Regional Trade Agreements Information System (RTA-IS), 72 PTAs entered into effect during 
2008–12. A vast majority of these (70%) include provisions on both goods and services trade. 
Twenty-seven of the 50 STAs involve at least one Asian trading partner, and 11 of these have 
been entered into with another partner from Asia. Clearly then, Asian economies have been at 
the forefront of the burgeoning trend toward services preferentialism, offering a potentially 
fertile setting for exploring this paper’s core research questions.      
 
Regulatory heterogeneity has been shown to exert a significantly negative impact on bilateral 
services trade via Mode 3 (commercial presence) (Kox and Nordas 2009) and commercial 
presence is the most dominant mode of service delivery, accounting for 55%–60% of all 
services trade flows.2 We would thus expect trading partners in a services accord to exhibit 
lower levels of regulatory heterogeneity compared to those not party to such an agreement. 
                                                
1 For the purpose of this paper, Asia comprises Bangladesh, Cambodia, the People’s Republic of China, India, 
Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, 
and Viet Nam. These are the countries for which information on services regulation is available in the World 
Bank’s Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (STRI) database (Borchert et.al. 2012).   
2 These are based on statistical estimates for 2005 provided by the WTO. 
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Interestingly, this is not found to be true for the Asian economies studied in this paper. The 
causal links actually run in the opposite direction.  
 
Regulatory approximation or convergence thus appears as one of the main objectives of 
negotiated services agreements rather than its chief determinant: the greater the extent of 
regulatory heterogeneity between trading partners, the more likely are they to enter into a 
services agreement to promote trade- and investment-facilitating regulatory convergence. 
Significantly, this proposition is validated by the empirical analysis undertaken for our sample 
countries.         
 
 
2. Review of the Related Literature 
 
Services preferentialism has spawned three strands of literature to date. A first strand has 
investigated the trade effect of services accords on aggregate and disaggregated services trade 
flows, using advanced estimation techniques from the rapidly evolving gravity model empirical 
literature (Park 2002, François and Hoekman 2009, Grunfeld and Moxnes 2003, Kimura and 
Lee 2004, Lennon 2009, Marchetti 2009, Shingal 2013, van der Marel and Shepherd 2011, 
Walsh 2006).3   
 
A second strand has explored the impact that differing levels of (and heterogeneity in) 
regulation exert on bilateral services trade flows (François et al. 2007, Fink 2009, Kox and 
Lejour 2006, Kox and Nordas 2007 and 2009, Schwellnus 2007, van der Marel and Shepherd 
2011). A third strand has resorted to theoretical and empirical techniques to estimate barriers 
to trade in services and foreign direct investment (FDI), and/or provide estimates of services 
trade costs (François et al. 2007, Miroudot et al. 2010 and 2012, van der Marel 2011).  
 
The literature has also evolved to explain services commitments in the GATS (Roy 2011), those 
made reciprocally (Marchetti et al., 2012) as well as GATS+ commitments in STAs (van der 
Marel and Miroudot 2012). 
 
The two papers closest to ours are Baier and Bergstrand (2004), who were the first to examine 
the determinants of partners’ propensities to negotiate PTAs, and Cole and Guillin (2012), who 
explored this issue for services accords. The latter paper, however, did not consider regulatory 
convergence as a determinant for entering into negotiations. Studying the role of regulatory 
convergence is thus the main contribution of this paper. This is done through recourse to a 
new World Bank dataset on measures of services (regulatory) restrictiveness (Borchert et.al. 
2012).4  
 
Baier and Bergstrand (2004) found the potential welfare gains and likelihood of a PTA in goods 
trade between a pair of countries to be higher  
 
                                                
3 An elaboration of these techniques is beyond the scope of this paper but an excellent review is provided in Head 
and Mayer (2013). 
4 See the World Bank’s STRI database at http://iresearch.worldbank.org/servicetrade/home.htm 
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(i) the closer (in terms of distance) the two trading partners were;  
(ii) the more remote they were from the rest of the world (ROW);  
(iii) the larger and more similar they were economically, in real gross domestic 
product (GDP) terms, to enable exploitation of economies of scale in the 
presence of differentiated products;  
(iv) the greater the difference in factor endowments between the dyad emanating 
from Heckscher–Ohlin trade; and  
(v) the lesser the difference in factor endowment ratios of the member countries 
relative to those of the ROW, leading to less inter-industry trade diversion.  
 
Baier and Bergstrand (2004) found these factors to have economically and statistically 
significant effects on the probability of negotiating a PTA covering trade in goods. 
 
In comparison, Cole and Guillin (2012) examined a dyad’s propensity to negotiate a services 
agreement and in their baseline specification found statistically significant evidence only for 
the “natural trading partner hypothesis,” similarity in terms of economic size, and factor 
endowment differences—both those emanating from Heckscher–Ohlin trade and those 
leading to less inter-industry trade diversion. 
 
 
3. Regulation in Services Trade  
 
Regulatory measures affect cross-border trade and investment in services by increasing both 
the fixed cost of entering a market and the variable cost of servicing that market. Where 
regulation is destination-specific, such costs can become sunk, which makes the decision to 
export similar to an investment decision, and involves a self-selection process studied in the 
“new new trade theory” literature (Melitz 2003; Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple 2004; Bernard, 
Redding, and Scott 2007; Chaney 2008). Essentially, only firms with the highest productivity 
and/or lowest marginal costs tend to profitably overcome sunk market-entry costs, thereby 
self-selecting themselves into becoming exporters.  
  
In the context of a services PTA, regulatory requirements assume significance for firms in both 
markets and the objective of the agreement is usually two-fold: (i) to bring down the level and 
incidence of restrictive regulation in both markets; and (ii) to promote convergence and 
approximation (including through mutual recognition), and ultimately (but less frequently) to 
harmonize regulatory practices between trading partners.  
 
The measure of regulation in services markets used in this paper is the Services Trade 
Restrictiveness Index (STRI) recently released by the World Bank. Compiled from responses 
to questionnaires sent out by the World Bank to 79 developing countries on impediments to 
international integration, and from publicly available information for Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, STRI is a quantitative index of 
restrictions on services trade encompassing 103 countries, 5 major service sectors, and 19 sub-
sectors. The information is also available by modes of service delivery. 
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A comparison of STRI by regions and groups in Table 1 shows that the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) has the most restrictive services trade policies, followed by South Asia (SA), 
East Asia and the Pacific (EAP), and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), with the last also being the 
most heterogeneous cohort. As expected, OECD countries and Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia (ECA) not only report the lowest STRI values but also form the most homogeneous 
cohorts. Significantly, the Asian region is not only very restrictive but also highly heterogeneous 
in terms of services trade impediments, which again makes it a relevant case study for the 
purposes of this enquiry.  
 
Table 1: Comparison of STRI across Regions and Groups 
 
Region or Group LAC ECA EAP OECD SSA SA MENA World 
Mean  21.6 18.8 39.1 19.1 32.0 43.9 45.2 28.3 
Standard deviation 10.0 6.7 13.9 4.8 16.6 13.7 11.2 14.9 
 
EAP = East Asia and the Pacific, ECA = Eastern Europe and Central Asia, LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean, MENA = Middle 
East and North Africa, OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, SA = South Asia, SSA = Sub-Saharan 
Africa.   
Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Bank STRI database. 
 
A closer look at Table 1 provides an intuitive feel for the factors likely to make countries 
potential candidates for negotiated regulatory convergence. For instance, high levels of per 
capita income, economic development, and political stability all likely contribute to the 
observed homogeneity in STRI among OECD countries despite significant differences in 
language, culture, and distances within this cohort. In the case of ECA, on the other hand, there 
is greater homogeneity of language, culture, and distances, though more differences in terms of 
per capita income and economic development. This seems to suggest that a combination of 
these factors could determine which countries are potential candidates for negotiated 
regulatory convergence.    
 
 
4. Methodology  
 
In their seminal work exploring the determinants of partners’ propensities to negotiate bilateral 
trade agreements, Baier and Bergstrand (2004) documented how distance, remoteness, 
economic country size, and factor endowments were the main economic determinants. Their 
analysis led to the following testable propositions: 
 
A dyad’s propensity to negotiate an agreement is directly proportional to 
(i) the proximity between them in terms of distance,  
(ii) remoteness from the ROW, 
(iii) the size and similarity of their economic markets,  
(iv) their relative factor endowment ratio, and  
(v) the inverse of the difference of their factor endowments from the ROW. 
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Baier and Bergstrand (2004) also consider other institutional and political economy 
determinants in their robustness checks. We use the same set of determinants in our empirical 
analysis and test the same propositions. 
   
Our empirical framework draws on McFadden’s (1975 and 1976) qualitative choice models, 
where utility is modeled as a latent, unobservable variable (y*) that can be explained by a 
vector of explanatory variables (x).  
 
Formally, y* = βo + βx + e, where x is the vector of explanatory variables; β is a vector of 
parameters; and e is the error term, assumed to be independent of x and to have a standard 
normal distribution.  
 
Since y* cannot be observed, an indicator variable STA is used, which takes the value 1 
(indicating y*>0) if a trading dyad has a services agreement and 0 (indicating y*<=0) 
otherwise.  
 
More formally,  
 
STA = 1 if y*>0 and P(STA=1) = P(y*>0) = G(α+βx)                         (1)  
 
where P is the response probability associated with a trading dyad signing a services accord; 
G(.) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function that ensures that P(STA=1) lies 
between 0 and 1.  
 
Empirically, given the dichotomy of the dependent variable, equation (1) leads itself to a probit 
estimation.5    
 
The main objective of services PTAs is to increase bilateral trade in services. Regulatory 
convergence is one of the important channels through which services accords can expand 
services trade volumes. Thus, the determinants of a country’s choice to negotiate a services 
accord are likely to be indistinguishable from those that inform whether certain countries are 
more likely candidates for such regulatory convergence. 
 
Thus, in a secondary estimation, we regress regulatory heterogeneity between dyads on the 
same set of control variables to examine if the determinants of sample countries’ propensities 
to negotiate a services accord are similar to those that determine if these countries are also 
potential candidates for regulatory convergence from a services trade perspective. 
                                                
5 While the statistical significance of the probit estimates can be determined, the non-linear nature of G(.) implies 
that the coefficient estimates only reveal the signs of the partial effects of changes in x on the probability of 
signing an STA. Thus, the direction of the effect of variable xk on E(y*|x) = α+βx is only qualitatively (not 
quantitatively) identical to the effect of xk on E(STA|x) =G(α+βx), where E(.) denotes the expectation of a 
variable. Our choice of the probit follows McFadden’s (1975 and 1976) qualitative choice models and mirrors the 
methodology that Baier and Bergstrand (2004) follow with the 1,431 cross-sectional pairings in their own sample of 
54 countries. Moreover, we also control for linear combinations of real GDP and factor endowment ratios on the 
RHS of equation (1). Since the latter are well-known proxies for per capita income (Egger and Larch 2008), we 
also control for levels of economic development, which further renders equation (1) fit for probit estimation. 
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Formally, DREGij = ά + ήx + ε                                               (2) 
 
where DREGij is the absolute value of the difference between the logs of STRI of both 
countries and ε is the error term.   
 
 
5. Explanatory variables 
 
Following Baier and Bergstrand (2004), for any dyad ij, the vector x includes two geographic 
variables: Naturalij, which is the inverse of distance between i and j, and Remoteij, which is the 
simple average of the mean distance between both countries and their partners.6 Economic 
country sizes are represented by SRGDPij, which is the sum of the logs of real GDP of country i 
and j, and DRGDPij, which is the absolute value of the difference between the logs of real GDP 
of both countries. DKLij and DROWKLij determine the role of factor endowments in 
countries’ propensities to negotiate agreements. DKLij is the absolute value of the difference 
between the logs of capital-labor ratios of country i and j. The variable SQDKLij is DKLij 
squared and is included to control for the likely quadratic relationship with the probability to 
negotiate a services agreement. To compare with ROW endowments, DROWKLij is included 
and calculated as the absolute value of the difference between the logs of capital-labor ratios 
of country i and j and those of the ROW.7 
 
Institutional variables in x include common language, colonial antecedents, and legal origins. 
More importantly from the perspective of this paper, we also control for the level of services 
regulation in the dyad (SREGij, which is the sum of the logs of STRIi and STRIj) and regulatory 
heterogeneity between partners by including the absolute value of the difference between the 
logs of STRI of both countries (DREGij). 
 
 
6. Data 
 
Data on STAs are taken from the WTO’s RTA-IS, where STA = 1 for agreements notified under 
Article V of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) in 2008–12 and 0 otherwise. 
With the exception of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the STRI for all countries in our 
sample relates to 2008. Since regulatory convergence is an objective of services 
preferentialism, to minimize endogeneity in our estimation emanating from reverse causality 
                                                
6  Formally, 
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we only consider services accords that came into effect in 2008 or later.8 The STRI for the PRC 
is for 2011. However, the PRC has only concluded one services accord to date (with Pakistan), 
which is unlikely to influence either its STRI considerably or this paper’s overall results.  
 
The Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII) gravity dataset 
(Head et al. 2010) provides geographic distances between capital cities that are used to 
compute Naturalij and Remoteij. Data on real GDP are taken from the Penn World Tables 
(PWT) and these are used to calculate SRGDPij and DRGDPij. 
 
Factor endowment ratios are computed from estimated capital stock and the number of 
workers. We do this following Marchetti’s methodology used in the Extended PWT and these 
ratios enable the calculation of DKLij, SQDKLij, and DROWKLij.9 Following Hulton and Wycoff 
(1981), the Perpetual Inventory Method, which is detailed in OECD (2009), is used to estimate 
the stock of capital.10 The number of workers is calculated using the PWT.11 The capital-labor 
ratio is thus the estimated capital stock divided by the number of workers. 
 
The earliest STA involving at least one Asian partner (New Zealand–Singapore) entered into 
effect on 1 January 2001. Since trade agreements are typically phased in over multi-year 
transition periods and to control for potential endogeneity in our estimation, our data on the 
time-varying independent variables are for 1980. The choice of this early year is also likely to 
control for any domino effects that the earliest STAs may have exerted on the recent wave of 
services preferentialism involving Asian economies.    
 
Data on common language and colonial antecedents are taken from the CEPII gravity dataset 
(Head et al. 2010), while those on legal origins are compiled using Shleifer (1999).12 More 
importantly from the perspective of this paper, we also control for the level of services 
regulation in the dyad (SREGij, which is the sum of the logs of STRIi and STRIj) and regulatory 
heterogeneity between partners by including the absolute value of the difference between the 
logs of STRI of both countries (DREGij).  
 
To test for the role of political stability in the choice of potential partners, we also proxied the 
extent of political homogeneity in the dyads by including the absolute value of the difference 
                                                
8 Only two services agreements were negotiated between Asian economies prior to 2008: Japan–Malaysia (2006) 
and Japan–Thailand (2007). Our sample size thus remains effectively the same even without these two 
agreements.  
9 https://sites.google.com/a/newschool.edu/duncan-foley-homepage/home/EPWT 
10 Formally,   T
i
iT
iT
t
stock IdK )1( + I(1-d/2) and It = PoptRGDPpctkit where It corresponds to the real 
investment in year t, obtained from real investment share of GDP (kit), real GDP per capita in constant dollars 
(chain index) denoted by RGDPpct, and population (Popt) provided by the PWT. By assumption, i = 1, 2, 3…14; that 
is, the asset life is 14 years and the depreciation rate, d, is 7.5%. Kstockt is the cumulated depreciated sum of past 
investments. 
11 Formally, 
t
w
t
pc
t
t RGDP
RGDPPopN   where Nt is the number of workers and RGDPwt is the real GDP per worker in 
constant dollars.   
12 http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/files/qgov_web.xls 
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between the logs of the State Fragility Index13 (SFI), compiled by the Center for Systemic 
Peace, of both countries (DSFIij) for 1995.14 However, the inclusion of this variable created 
problems of multicolinearity and rendered the coefficients of all other variables statistically 
insignificant across estimations. In the absence of a strong theoretical justification for its 
inclusion we therefore decided to drop the variable.         
 
In line with the endogenous protection literature (Trefler 1993), we also control for import 
penetration by using data on these countries’ average bilateral trade. Since data on bilateral 
services trade were not available either for all countries in our sample or for the period before 
1999, we used bilateral trade in goods data from UN Comtrade (TRADEij). To the extent 
possible, we used averages over 1978–1980. However, in some cases, the earliest available years 
were 1984–86 (PRC), 1998–2000 (Mongolia and Viet Nam), and 2000–02 (Cambodia).  
 
Finally, to control for the politics of preferentialism à la Grossman and Helpman (1995), we 
included the absolute value of the difference in the logarithms of a dyad’s average global trade 
flows (DTRADE) as described above.  
   
A priori, with the exception of DRGDPij, DROWKLij, TRADEij, and DTRADE, we expect the 
coefficients of all the other variables to be positive. Neighboring countries are more likely to 
sign a trade agreement, especially if both are remote from the ROW; this is likely to be true of 
services accords as well. Similar and larger economically-sized countries are also likely to gain 
more due to the exploitation of economies of scale and the presence of greater varieties 
flowing from deeper integration. The greater the difference in relative factor endowments 
between countries, and the larger the intercontinental trade costs, the greater trade creation is 
likely to be. On the other hand, the greater the difference in relative factor endowments 
between potential partners and the ROW, the more likely trade diversion becomes. Protection 
tends to be higher in sectors with greater import penetration. This means that more trade is 
likely to be associated with less inclination to negotiate a trade accord. Political pressure to 
prevent an agreement is reduced the more balanced potential trade is between partner 
countries (which would be reflected in smaller values of DTRADE). Finally, dyads with 
common institutions and homogeneity in regulation are more likely to enter into agreements, 
as are partners with high initial barriers to services trade. All data are summarized in Annex 
Table A1. 
 
 
7. Results 
 
The results from the probit estimation are reported in Table 2. The first three specifications 
control for economic, institutional, and political economy determinants separately; these are 
                                                
13 More information on the SFI is available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/SFIv2011a.xls. The index ranges 
from 0 (no fragility) to 25 (extreme fragility). According to the Center for Systemic Peace, “[a] country’s fragility is 
closely associated with its state capacity to manage conflict, make and implement public policy, and deliver 
essential services; and its systemic resilience in maintaining system coherence, cohesion, and quality of life; 
responding effectively to challenges and crises; and sustaining progressive development.”  
14 This is the earliest year for which the SFI has been formulated.  
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then introduced in combination in specifications IV–VI, with the final specification controlling 
for all determinants together. 
 
The results reported in columns I–III suggest that economic determinants exert a greater 
influence than both institutional and political economy factors, though the model has the 
lowest explanatory power with only institutional determinants (pseudo-R-squared = 11%). 
Moreover, most of the variables within these three sets of determinants—with the exception 
of NAT (weakly), SRGDP, DROWKL, and TRADE—are individually statistically insignificant.  
 
The negative coefficient of NAT (across specifications in general) suggests that distance 
seems to have a positive, counter-intuitive relationship with the propensity to negotiate 
services agreements in Asia. Alternatively, our findings offer no support to the natural trading 
partner hypothesis within Asia, at least with respect to services preferentialism. This finding is 
also consistent with the negative sign on the constant term across most specifications. That 
trading partners may be willing to negotiate services agreements despite the effect of distance 
becomes more readily understandable when one considers that almost a fourth of all services 
trade is delivered by Mode 1 (cross-border supply), where the effect of distance is far more 
benign, if not completely absent.   
 
In the case of TRADE too, the positive sign of the coefficient is not as expected—the more 
traded goods sectors seem to be more likely to negotiate a services accord, a finding that 
contradicts the endogenous protection literature as well as the results found in Baier and 
Bergstrand (2004). On the other hand, the positive sign of this coefficient could also suggest 
greater goods trade leading to a successful erosion of vested protectionist interests in services 
leading in turn to juggernaut and domino forces, as described in Baldwin (2006), which may 
facilitate the conclusion of services accords. Moreover, the positive coefficient can also be 
explained by the rising salience of trade in intermediate products—both goods and services—
made pervasive by the growth of regional value chains, especially in the context of East Asia 
and the Pacific.     
    
The coefficients of SRGDP and DROWKL both have the expected signs and suggest that 
similarity in the economic size of partners and smaller differences in their factor endowment 
ratios compared to the ROW lead to a higher likelihood of negotiating a services accord. 
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Table 2: Estimating the Likelihood of Negotiating a Services Agreement in Asia 
 
Probit estimation: Dependent variable STA 
Variables I II III IV V VI VII 
REM (+) 2.45   8.59 –2.61  1.73 
 (4.17)   (5.45) (4.89)  (7.41) 
NAT (+) –1.06#   –0.98 1.92*  –1.83# 
 0.56   (0.62) (0.78)  (1.02) 
SRGDP (+) 0.24*   0.29* –0.23  –0.11 
 (0.1)   (0.12) (0.22)  (0.32) 
DRGDP (–) –0.21   –0.3 0.09  0.24 
 (0.18)   (0.2) (0.29)  (0.33) 
DKL (+) 0.48   0.19 0.32  0.17 
 (0.58)   (0.63) (0.7)  (0.76) 
SQDKL (+) 0.03   0.2 0.1  0.04 
 (0.13)   (0.14) (0.16)  (0.18) 
DROWKL (–) –1.22*   –0.39 –1.06#  –0.4 
 (0.54)   (0.63) (0.62)  (0.78) 
SREG (+)  –0.02  –0.94  –1.19* –1.05 
  (0.38)  (0.7)  (0.6) (1.01) 
DREG (+)  0.76  0.88  1.73* 2.03# 
  (0.5)  (0.73)  (0.77) (1.1) 
Com_lang (+)  0.19  0.11  –0.13 –0.19 
  (0.54)  (0.72)  (0.67) (0.85) 
Com_col (+)  4.72  6.23  6.34 4.73 
  (315.36)  (383.82)  (361.66) (337.4) 
Com_law (+)  –4.53  –4.49  –6.06 –3.89 
  (315.36)  (383.81)  (361.66) (337.4) 
Trade (–)   0.33***  0.54* 0.42*** 0.52 
   (0.1)  (0.24) (0.11) (0.33) 
DTRADE (–)   –0.22  –0.70* –0.56* –0.96* 
   (0.17)  (0.3) (0.27) (0.41) 
Constant –43.21  –6.41*** –95.4# 10.8 0.23 –27.78 
 (39.38)  (1.73) (50.32) (46.27) (4.28) (69.32) 
N 103 103 97 103 97 97 97 
df_m 7 5 2 12 9 7 14 
Pseudo-r2 0.37 0.11 0.27 0.46 0.52 0.48 0.61 
Notes: Levels of significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels are denoted by #, *, **, and ***, respectively. Standard errors
reported in brackets. The signs against the variables denote the expected signs of the coefficients. 
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These results hold in specifications V and VI, though the explanatory power of the model is 
considerably improved when economic and political economy factors are combined. On the 
other hand, none of the coefficients, except that on SRGDP, is found to be individually 
statistically significant when economic and institutional determinants are used together in 
specification IV. 
 
In specifications V and VI, the coefficients of DREG and DTRADE also have the expected signs 
and show statistical significance. SREG, on the other hand, seems to be inversely related to the 
propensity to negotiate a services accord. The latter finding runs contrary to expectations and 
would appear to suggest that Asian trading partners may be negotiating services agreements 
more for purposes of promoting regulatory convergence than to bring down levels of restrictive 
services regulation. However, such a finding could also emanate from the negative correlation 
between SREG and DREG in our sample (value of correlation coefficient 0.44), suggesting that 
dyads with more restrictive services regulation are also more homogeneous partners. 
 
Finally, when all factors are controlled for in specification VII, only NAT (weakly), DREG 
(weakly), and DTRADE are statistically significant, but the latter specification exhibits the most 
robust explanatory power (pseudo R-squared = 61%). While TRADE loses its earlier statistical 
significance, the coefficient of DTRADE increases in absolute value. Significantly, the 
coefficient of DREG continues to report the expected sign and also becomes stronger in terms 
of effect, but weakens in terms of statistical significance. 
 
A comparison of our model’s predictions for STA when fully specified in column VII with the 
actual value of STA reveals that the propensity to negotiate (or not) an STA is correctly 
predicted for 95% of the 103 dyads in our sample.15 Of the total, 14 dyads actually negotiated an 
STA and 10 of these were correctly predicted by our model. The remaining 89 dyads did not 
have a services accord and our model correctly predicted 88 (99%) of these.  
 
We also found evidence of insufficient services preferentialism in our sample for the PRC–
Japan (STApred = 0.92) wherein our model suggested the existence of a services accord that 
does not exist at the moment. At the same time, the Republic of Korea seems to exhibit 
excessive services preferentialism in its agreements with members of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN): Cambodia (STApred = 0.32 ), the Philippines (STApred = 
0.45), and Viet Nam (STApred = 0.38). The same is true for the PRC–Pakistan (STApred = 0.02). 
In all cases, both sets of trading partners have a services agreement, though our model 
suggests a very low probability for this.      
 
7.1 Secondary Results 
 
Table 3 reports the results from the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of the secondary 
specification. As before, columns I–III report the results from estimations that control for 
economic, institutional, and political economy determinants separately; columns IV–VII report 
results from estimations that include these variables in different combinations. 
                                                
15 To enable this comparison, we used the decision-rule from Baier and Bergstrand (2004). If STApred > 0.5, then we 
take this value to be 1. If STApred<=0, then we take this value to be 0.  
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At the outset, the explanatory power of the secondary estimation is low; even the fully-
specified model in column VII has an adjusted R-squared of 31%. This said, a few of the 
explanatory variables report the expected signs of coefficients. Thus, dyads more remote from 
the ROW tend to be more homogeneous in services regulation—the coefficient of REM is 
negative and statistically significant across specifications. Commonality in institutions is likely 
to result in demand for (and greater supply of) regulatory convergence; yet, we see evidence of 
this only in the coefficient of common legal origins.  
 
In the case of economic determinants, DRGDP, DROWKL, and SRGDP (in one specification) 
show statistical significance, with the coefficients of DRGDP (positive) and DROWKL 
(negative) showing the expected signs throughout the specifications. 
 
The result of the sum of economic size of trading partners is harder to interpret as our data 
suggest a very low inverse relationship between market size and services regulation 
(correlation coefficient = –0.1). The impact of combined market size on differences in 
regulation is thus uncertain and perhaps this is what is reflected in the near-zero coefficient of 
SRGDP across specifications in Table 3. 
 
A more interesting result from the secondary estimation emanates from the coefficient of 
SREG, corroborating the negative partial correlation coefficient between the two variables. 
This suggests that a more regulated dyad is also more homogeneous in services regulation, and 
the result is found to be statistically significant across specifications. 
 
Moreover, dyads in a services agreement seem more divergent in terms of services regulation. 
This is a somewhat curious result suggesting that the causality runs in reverse. Thus, the 
greater the extent of regulatory heterogeneity between trading partners, the more likely they 
are to enter into a services agreement to promote regulatory convergence. Of course, since the 
data on STRI pertain to 2008 and we only include services agreements negotiated in 2008–12 
in our sample, our results are impervious to this reverse causality.  
 
Finally, the coefficient of TRADE is negative as expected. Sectors characterized by greater 
trade intensity are also more likely to see a convergence in regulation facilitating such trade. 
This result too is statistically significant across specifications. Moreover, more balanced trade 
between partners is likely to be associated with similarities in the regulatory frameworks of 
trading partners. Thus, if DTRADE is low, DREG is also likely to be low. However, the sign on 
DTRADE fluctuates through specifications and also lacks statistical significance.  
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Table 3: Determinants of Regulatory Differences in Services within Asia 
 
OLS estimation: Dependent variable DREG 
Variables I II III IV V VI VII 
REM (–) –1.09#   –1.38* –1.22*  –1.39* 
 (0.55)   (0.58) (0.55)  (0.59) 
NAT (–) –0.08   0.01 –0.02  0.06 
 (0.06)   (0.06) (0.07)  (0.07) 
SRGDP (+/–) -0.03#   –0.02 –0.01  0.01 
 (0.01)   (0.01) (0.02)  (0.02) 
DRGDP (+) 0.07**   0.05* 0.09**  0.06* 
 (0.02)   (0.02) (0.03)  (0.03) 
DKL (+) 0.02   0.03 –0.02  –0.01 
 0.09   (0.08) (0.09)  (0.09) 
SQDKL (+) 0   –0.01 0.01  0 
 (0.02)   (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) 
DROWKL (–) –0.18***   –0.13* –0.16**  –0.14** 
 (0.05)   (0.05) (0.05)  (0.05) 
STA (–)  0.15 0.34** 0.23* 0.30** 0.23* 0.25* 
  (0.09) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) 
SDREG (–)  –0.29***  –0.16*  –0.25*** –0.19* 
  (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.07) 0.07 
Com_lang (–)  0.09  0.04  0.11 0 
  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.11) 0.11 
Com_col (–)  0.1  0.04  0.12 0.07 
  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.12) (0.12) 
Com_law (–)  –0.13  –0.18*  –0.14# –0.19* 
  (0.08)  (0.09)  (0.08) (0.09) 
Trade (–)   –0.03**  –0.03# –0.02* –0.03# 
   (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
DTRADE (+)   0.03  –0.03 0.01 –0.02 
   (0.02)  (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
Constant 11.11* 2.56*** 0.83*** 15.49** 12.41* 2.57*** 15.19** 
 (5.06) (0.41) (0.17) (5.33) (5.08) (0.48) (5.54) 
N 103 103 97 103 97 97 97 
df_m 7 5 3 12 10 7 14 
r2 0.25 0.24 0.14 0.39 0.32 0.3 0.41 
r2-a 0.2 0.23 0.11 0.31 0.24 0.24 0.31 
 
Notes: Levels of significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels are denoted by #, *, **, and ***, respectively. Standard errors 
reported in brackets. The signs against the variables denote the expected signs of the coefficients. 
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8. Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper explored the question of whether certain countries within Asia are more likely 
candidates for negotiated regulatory convergence and harmonization in the context of services 
agreements. The two papers closest to the analysis on offer in this paper are Baier and 
Bergstrand (2004), who were the first to ask this question from the perspective of agreements 
focusing on goods trade, and Cole and Guillin (2012), who first explored the issue for services 
accords without, however, considering the influence of regulation in services trade.  
 
While our results may be Asia-specific, the goodness-of-fit of our empirical model, 
demonstrated by the probabilities predicted successfully, is in line with the results found in 
Baier and Bergstrand (2004) and improve on those found in Cole and Guillin (2012).  
 
Our results suggest that large Asian economies, in terms of real GDP, with fewer differences in 
relative factor endowments compared to the ROW, near balanced trade, and divergent 
regulatory frameworks are more likely to negotiate services agreements with each other. 
Contrary to expectations, we also found that more distant economies with lower levels of 
restrictive regulation in the dyad and higher levels of pre-existing trade are more likely 
candidates for services preferentialism in the region. India and Japan are a case in point. 
 
Our results also suggest that Asian countries more remote from the ROW and with similar 
economic sizes, greater differences in relative factor endowments compared to the ROW, 
common legal origins, high levels of pre-existing trade, and restrictive services regulation are 
also more likely candidates for regulatory convergence. Indonesia and the Philippines would 
appear to meet such criteria. 
 
Finally, our empirical results argue in favor of a future PRC–Japan services accord (abstracting 
from the various political considerations weighing on the bilateral relationship). They also 
suggest that the PRC–Pakistan services PTA and the services agreements that the Republic of 
Korea has entered into with Cambodia, the Philippines, and Viet Nam via the ASEAN–
Republic of Korea accord are illustrative of “excessive” services preferentialism in the region.     
 
A number of policy implications can be derived from the above results. For starters, far from 
inhibiting the quest for deeper market integration, ex ante divergences in regulatory regimes 
and enforcement capacities may well prove a significant spur to negotiated convergence, 
allowing parties to import best trade- and investment-facilitating standards from partners with 
greater overall regulatory efficiency. Where regulatory divergences are so marked as to inhibit 
market integration, the supply of adequate doses of variable geometry in meeting otherwise 
common policy objectives may represent a useful means to promote convergence. A case in 
point is ASEAN where, despite far-reaching income and development gaps within the regional 
grouping, significant regulatory convergence has been achieved through formulas that 
internalize the need for differentiated implementation modalities across members.16  
                                                
16 At year-end 2012, the per capita income level of Singapore, ASEAN’s wealthiest member, was 45.1 tims higher in 
purchasing power parity (PPP) terms to that of Myanmar, the regional grouping’s poorest member, making 
ASEAN arguably the most heterogeneous regional grouping to have embarked (quite successfully to date) on the 
path of deep and sustained regulatory convergence and integration. 
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Moreover, the statistical insignificance of geographic proximity as a determining influence in 
the choice of STA partners within Asia must be understood in light of two key characteristics 
of services trade that allow remote partners to engage in deep forms of integration. First, the 
unfolding revolution in information and communications technologies increasingly favors the 
supply of ever-increasing doses of services delivered across borders in manners that are 
increasingly insensitive to considerations of time and space (and hence distance). Meanwhile, 
the continued predominance of services supplied through a commercial presence in the 
territory of the consumer, a dimension of services trade for which no equivalent exists in the 
goods trade, in effect reduces distance to zero and allows larger (and likely capital-exporting) 
countries to aspire to high degrees of market integration with smaller and/or distant partners. 
Efforts directed at the progressive dismantling of obstacles to trade and investment in services 
through Mode 1 (cross-border supply) and Mode 3 (commercial presence) may thus be 
important means of neutralizing the impact of distance on market integration in services. 
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Annex 
Table A1: Summary Statistics 
 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Geography 
Distance (km) 103 3214.4 1433.5 536.0 6861.3 
NAT 103 -8.0 0.5 -8.8 -6.3 
REM 103 9.1 0.1 9.0 9.3 
Economic 
rgdp p (USD bn) 103 177.0 427.0 3.7 2190.0 
rgdp r (USD bn) 103 376.0 580.0 3.7 2190.0 
SRGDP 103 50.0 2.4 44.1 55.7 
DRGDP 103 2.2 1.5 0.0 6.4 
l_p (mn) 103 29.1 63.4 0.6 504.0 
k_p (USD bn) 103 414.0 1150.0 3.1 5950.0 
l_r (mn) 103 110.0 167.0 0.6 504.0 
k_r (USD bn) 103 901.0 1580.0 3.1 5950.0 
kl_p (USD/worker) 103 14333.4 20330.4 939.7 105607.2 
kl_r (USD/worker) 103 16016.4 27512.3 939.7 105607.2 
kl_row (USD/worker) 103 23803.1 2303.0 20506.2 32659.0 
DKL 103 1.6 1.1 0.0 4.7 
SQDKL 103 3.8 4.6 0.0 22.3 
DROWKL 103 1.5 0.7 0.0 3.1 
Institutional 
stri_r 103 38.8 14.3 13.7 65.7 
stri_p 103 38.5 12.7 13.7 65.7 
DREG 103 0.5 0.4 0.0 1.6 
SREG 103 7.2 0.3 5.8 8.2 
Com_lang 103 0.1 0.6 0.0 1.0 
Com_col 103 0.1 0.3 0.0 1.0 
Com_law 103 0.3 0.5 0.0 1.0 
STA 103 0.1 0.3 0.0 1.0 
Political economy 
trade_r (USD bn) 103 17.3 28.8 0.1 110.0 
Trade_p (USD bn) 103 10.3 20.9 0.1 110.0 
TRADE 97 15.8 3.4 6.9 22.9 
DTRADE 103 2.0 1.4 0.0 6.8 
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